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The paper shows how redundancies were resisted by Hi-Tech 
workers in a large German company. It details an employee 
network’s emergence to provide support to individuals and to 
pursue legal cases against the company, and analyzes the network’s 
norms and operation. The network operated in complementary ways 
to the union and works council, to achieve a favourable outcome. 
The case is used to test theoretical propositions derived from 
literature on Hi-Tech workers, union renewal and mobilization 
theory and it is suggested that mobilization theory requires further 
extension in several directions.
This paper examines the emergence of an employee network at Siemens 
Hofmannstraße plant in Munich, Germany. It is one of a number of such 
networks to have emerged in Germany in recent years in an interesting 
development in worker self-organization that has been little discussed. 
When redundancies were announced among “Hi-Tech” white-collar 
workers at the plant, an employee network emerged, that operated in a 
creative but tension-ridden synergy with the works council (Betriebsrat) 
and trade union IG Metall (IGM). The network is not an alternative to these 
institutions, but both an adjunct to them and a critical faction within them. 
It proved a dynamic force in helping to resist redundancies, and has since 
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linked up with other employee networks, posing significant issues for the 
union: was this an opportunity or a threat for them? The paper therefore 
addresses what is paradoxically a neglected area of union renewal, i.e. 
worker self-organization and how a union interacted with it. It does so in 
the German context, arguably the core of the “European model” of worker 
representation. If it were to renew itself, the wider international resonance 
would be great.
The paper is structured as follows. Initially, literature is reviewed 
to generate a set of theoretical propositions about Hi-Tech workers, 
their behaviours and interactions with unions. The case study forms the 
bulk of the paper, in which we outline the origins and activities of the 
employee network and its relations with the works council and union, using 
mobilization theory to analyze the different roles of each institution. Finally, 
we conclude by reflecting on the initial propositions, the experience and its 
significance. Inter alia, we offer some suggestions as to how mobilization 
theory might be further extended.
LITERATURE
What Facilitates Mobilization among Hi-Tech Workers?
It has been widely argued that unions need new approaches to mobilizing 
and organizing workers (see for example Nissen, 1999; Turner et al., 2001; 
Voss and Sherman, 2000). Jarley (2005: 615) refers to a general need for 
unions to invest in “social capital” in order to make workers more likely 
to mobilize. Similarly, Johnson and Jarley (2005), drawing on experience 
in programmes aimed at young workers, suggest they are more likely to 
act in solidaristic ways if unions can draw on “network density” increased 
by associational activity. For several other North American authors, 
“associational” forms of organization (Heckscher, 1996; Wald, 1998; 
Benner, 2002; Van Jaarsveld, 2004) resembling professional associations, 
emphasizing mutual assistance, are particularly appropriate vehicles for 
Hi-Tech workers. In the WashTech/CWA case analyzed by Van Jaarsveld, 
WashTech emphasized mutual assistance and political action because of 
the difficulty in breaking into collective bargaining. Hence, all of these 
researchers stress the importance of networking, building associational 
ties at local level, political activity and mutual aid both for mobilizing 
and organizing Hi-Tech workers. Our first proposition is therefore: 
that emphasizing non-collective bargaining approaches may facilitate 
mobilization. Our second proposition is that these workers are likely to 
show a preference for non-traditional forms of collective organization. A 
third, closely related proposition is derived from the same researchers: that
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Hi-Tech workers’ organizations are likely to prioritize political and 
mutual aid activities over other possible fields of activity such as collective 
bargaining.
Institutional Embeddedness and Institutional Competition
Unions internationally have reviewed how they organize and operate. 
There has been much discussion on unions in Liberal Market Economies 
(LMEs), but prospects for union renewal globally are strongly affected 
by unions in Co-Ordinated Market Economies (CMEs), German unions 
exert strong influence in both European trade union institutions such as 
the ETUC and more widely in Global Union Federations because of their 
strong finances and perceived strength (Müller et al., 2003). This reflects 
the national context in which they operate. CMEs are so-called because 
they have high levels of institutional co-ordination, building high-trust, 
stable and long-term relationships between state, employers and unions 
(Hall and Soskice, 2001). Unions in CMEs are therefore situated in a 
very different broad social, political and economic context from their 
counterparts in LMEs, with consequences for how they seek to maintain 
their institutional positions. As Frege and Kelly (2004: 40) suggest, “Union 
power and influence is secured in different ways in different national 
systems,” with “organizing” approaches most likely to occur in “Liberal 
Market Economies” such as the USA or Britain.
“Organizing” approaches assume that unions adopt external orientations. 
In Germany, programmes of change such as IGM’s “participation-oriented 
workplace politics” have tried to involve new groups over the last twenty 
years, and to this limited extent may be described as “externally oriented.” 
However, they have also laid more emphasis than unions in LMEs on 
internal “organizational development” (Frerichs and Martens, 1999). 
IGM’s leadership has been criticized for failing to generalize even these 
initiatives beyond specific localities (Frerichs and Martens, 1999; Behrens 
et al., 2003), possibly because the union’s core of male, manual worker 
members exerts great internal influence and shows only marginal interest 
in minority groups (Hassel, 1999). Yet both the internal orientation of 
“organizational development” and the union leadership’s apparent failure 
to generalize initiatives may also be connected to the greater institutional 
support provided in CMEs to worker representation in general and unions in 
particular. It has been argued that this arises from a “central dilemma” for all 
German unions, between developing autonomous capacity for organization 
building and collective action on one hand, and the constraints resulting 
from institutional embeddedness on the other (Behrens et al., 2003: 37).
Despite recent modifications, the German IR system remains 
essentially a dual model (Jacobi et al., 1992; Müller-Jentsch, 1997), 
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functionally differentiated between industry-wide collective bargaining and 
workplace co-determination. In the first arena, industry-based employers’ 
associations and unions bargain mainly over wages and working time; in 
the second, elected works councils represent employees irrespective of 
union membership. Works councils operate in complex relationships with 
unions (Croucher and Singe, 2004). Works councilors are legally required 
to work with employers “in a spirit of co-operation,” and are forbidden to 
initiate collective action (Müller-Jentsch, 2004). The German system of co-
determination permits the establishment of work councils in undertakings 
employing a minimum of five workers. However, it provides unions with 
the possibility of having unionists elected as works councilors to represent 
all workers, with strong protection against dismissal, and in fact unionists 
constitute the great majority of works councilors (Müller-Jentsch, 2004). 
For long periods after World War II, unions were also strongly linked 
into the political process (Hyman, 2001), buttressing their position, while 
simultaneously locking them into bureaucratic, hierarchical processes that 
under-emphasize mobilization (Martens, 2005).
As the percentage of employees covered by neither collective 
bargaining nor by workplace representation stands at 27% in the western 
and at 42% in the eastern part of the country (Ellguth and Kohaut, 2005) 
gaps have developed within the system. Union penetration is especially 
low in highly qualified white-collar work. Partly because of this, Germany 
provides cases of the converse of our third proposition: there, emergent 
alternative organizations claiming representative and bargaining functions 
exist explicitly in competition with large general unions considered to be 
unrepresentative of specific interest groups (Renneberg, 2005: 261).
The issue of new organizations emerging in competition with unions 
may also be relevant in North America. It has been suggested that attempts 
by US unions to organize Hi-Tech workers “on an industrial model of 
unionism” have “almost universally failed” and there is therefore “little 
union representation in the information technology sector” (Benner, 
2002: 143). Benner argues that experience in Silicon Valley shows that 
professional associations, acting as labour market intermediaries and 
employee advocates, are in practice a more successful model. He also 
indicates that the boundaries between professional associations and unions 
catering for such workers have blurred in recent years, and we note that this 
gives rise to potential for institutional competition. In such situations, unions 
may be nervous that mobilization may lead to competitive institutions.
Thus, unions may, because of their institutional embeddedness and fear 
of competition, harbour reservations about mobilizations in their industrial 
sectors. Hence our fourth proposition, that unions will display ambivalence 
towards local mobilizations where possible rival organizations emerge.
6- Croucher pages.indd   146 2007-03-23   10:33:53
147A GERMAN EMPLOYEE NETWORK AND UNION RENEWAL
Hi-Tech Workers, Self-Organization and Mobilization Theory
Some, writing in a long-standing analytic tradition, have advocated 
unions building (or in longer-run historical terms, re-building) wider social 
movements by developing community coalitions (for recent examples, see 
Voss and Sherman, 2003; Fantasia and Voss, 2004). Fairbrother (2000) 
argues on the other hand that no specific new or revived form of unionism 
such as “social movement unionism” is in fact emerging. He further suggests 
that unions’ scope as organizations for transformation “from above” is 
limited: change is most likely to come from below, by workers organizing 
themselves (Fairbrother, 1996).
Evidence of such mobilizations, i.e. workers organizing themselves in 
ways not directly initiated by unions, is thin on the ground. Yet, although 
unions are clearly central to interest representation, the question is ultimately 
less one of how unions renew themselves, than of how workers defend their 
interests. However, Hi-Tech workers would not seem an especially likely 
group to throw up organizations of collective self-defence. Indeed, it has 
been suggested that “Hi-Tech” workers, have identities, mentalities and 
relationships to their work that makes them unlikely to show any interest in 
traditional forms of collective organization (see for example Milton, 2002). 
Recent German studies of highly qualified white-collar workers have found 
a distant relationship between them and unions (Baethge et al., 1995; Faust 
et al., 2000; Kotthoff, 1998). Kotthoff’s (1992) research on Hi-Tech workers 
found that they could be attracted to unions, but only if these developed 
a professional aura (professionalistische Ausstrahlung) and represented 
the specific mentalities of these employees, something very unlikely to be 
achieved by unions such as IG Metall. On the other hand, Van Jaarsveld 
(2004) provides evidence from the US context that collective responses are 
indeed possible, but that they take distinctive forms.
Precisely how mobilization is achieved is therefore an issue, and some 
theory is available here. Mobilization refers to the “process by which a group 
acquires collective control over the resources needed for action” (Tilly in 
Kelly, 1998: 25) and the theory emphasizes the importance of language, 
ideology and leadership. Mobilization theory takes as its point of departure 
the conditions required for workers’ mobilization. Mobilization stems from 
perceptions of and responses to injustice (Kelly, 1998: 126), which may be 
transformed into collective interests. This becomes the basis for collective 
organization, but for mobilization to occur, workers must “attribute” 
their problems to an agency. Attribution processes “both derive from and 
reinforce a sense of distinct group identity” (Kelly, 1998: 127). Workers 
overcome a sense that their grievance is not widely shared, and come to 
see their problems as collective. Leadership frames issues through language 
and sets issues into a wider context, emphasizing solidaristic values and 
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discouraging “free riding” by individuals. The three key elements are 
therefore attribution, social identity and leadership. Recent extensions of 
mobilization theory (Johnson and Jarley, 2004; Lévesque and Murray, 2002) 
introduce factors from social exchange theory to emphasize social cohesion, 
since social identity may not be a sufficient condition for mobilization. 
Mobilization theory draws on empirical research in the classic industrial 
relations tradition of the 1960s and 1970s on blue-collar workers where 
social cohesion may be less problematic than in our case. Nevertheless, 
the theory operates at a high level of abstraction, and this encourages the 
view that it may be applicable to workers more broadly. Our fifth and final 
proposition is therefore: that mobilization theory will provide an adequate 
framework for analysis of Hi-Tech workers mobilization.
RESEARCH ISSUES AND METHODS
Our propositions are examined through a case study structured to show 
the developing relationships during the conflict between Hi-Tech workers, 
the company and the three labour institutions. A multi-tiered approach 
was adopted because multiple types of actors were involved. There are 
four research strands. The first and fourth strands were preparatory and 
validatory; the core of the research consisted of the second and third 
elements. The first strand is observation, through one author’s involvement 
with IGM for over twenty years on a range of projects. The second strand 
is a set of eighteen semi-structured interviews with union officials, works 
councillors and network activists held in 2003-4 involving twenty-one people 
in total. These were followed up by four repeat interviews for clarification 
and up-dating purposes, held in the summer of 2006. Semi-structured 
interviews were conducted, transcribed, checked back with respondents and 
followed up with further telephone and e-mail inquiries for clarification. A 
third strand monitored a large volume of discussion in Siemens electronic 
employee fora. This was designed to study directly the nature of the daily 
exchanges taking place there, and provided an alternative perspective to 
interview accounts. The electronic exchanges were printed to provide just 
over one hundred pages of script, which was open coded (Strauss and 
Corbin, 1996) to establish shared themes. Contributions to network e-mail 
discussion were anonymous. They involved many different people and 
contributors themselves defined and contextualized problems. These data 
gave a broader picture than that available from activists and may also be 
more reliable than that derived from alternative methods such as focus 
groups or interviews where social desirability effects and over-directional 
interviewing are potential problems (Kvale, 1996). A fourth strand was 
designed to provide an informed expert perspective. Many of these experts 
had themselves some involvement with IGM, and at least three of them had 
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been involved with the Siemenskonflikt. This strand was participation in 
three one and a half day sessions on union OD-projects organized by the 
“Hattinger Kreis,” a group of union advisors and academics.
CASE STUDY
Siemens
Siemens is among Germany’s most important companies, employing 
417,000 including 170,000 in Germany (<www.siemens.de>). Siemens’ 
Munich Hofmannstraße site employs 12,000 and is their main location for 
developing telecommunication networks (ICN) and mobile communications 
(ICM). Hofmannstraße had for many years retained a paternalist 
“Siemensfamilie” culture, stressing consensual change and employee 
welfare. Nearly 70% of those employed at Hofmannstraße had university 
or Fachhochschule (University of Applied Sciences) degrees. Reflecting 
the high level of local qualifications, for nearly 50% of those working in 
ICN, wages and conditions were not determined by union-employer sectoral 
agreements as they were categorized as Außertarifliche Angestellte, i.e. 
their wages were above the scales negotiated in union-employer bargaining 
(Mayer, 2005: 2). Local union density in Siemens is low: estimates range 
from two to six per cent, but in a typical German pattern, IGM had a 
majority on the works council. Works councillors report that employees 
traditionally took little interest in voting in works council elections.
In order to address its weakness at one of Germany’s most important 
companies IG Metall had taken initiatives: By 1996 IGM had established a 
specific Siemens project in Bavaria which was extended to cover the whole 
of Germany in 2003 (Cramer, 2003). This indicated a shift from supplying a 
predominantly local union service for works councillors towards a national 
“task force,” i.e. a group of fully paid officers that focused solely on Siemens 
and tried to provide detailed analyses, research and advice to workplace 
representatives, “modernized” communication and fostered cooperation and 
exchange between different Siemens sites.
The last 15 years brought a new management approach. New managers 
demanded that employees take on wider responsibilities, allowed space for 
self-organization in working teams, performance targets were ratcheted 
upwards and pressure increased to work longer hours. A company 
previously recognized for its long-term orientation, high investment in 
research and development and good employee conditions was now managed 
according to short-term, “shareholder value” considerations (Schuhler, 2003: 
20-21). Thus, the company itself, by breaking well-established norms and 
consensual social values (Kelly, 1998: 27) was creating the precondition 
for attribution.
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Redundancy and Mobilization: Chronology
In August 2002 management announced that 2,300 jobs at 
Hofmannstraße’s ICN and 300 at ICM segments were to go within
six weeks. The underlying company strategy was to greatly reduce the 
permanent core of highly qualified staff and to strengthen R&D capacities 
in “low wage locations” abroad. The remaining workers in Munich were 
to be supplemented by external contract labour on a non-permanent basis 
should the economic situation or certain projects demand so (Mayer, 2005: 
2). Flexibility/redundancy thus “hit the core,” a strategy adopted by other 
German employers (Kratzer, 2003). The announcement triggered a conflict 
that lasted over 18 months.
As the company publicized its downsizing plans, it announced that 
employees were to be offered a choice between signing termination 
agreements including compensation payments and employment in a German 
“employment body” (Beschäftigungsgesellschaft) designed to place workers 
in new jobs and train them.
It was announced that employees not willing to accept either option 
were to be made redundant. The works council decided not to follow the 
path usually taken in similar situations, i.e. negotiating compensation 
payments and making sure that the legal obligations concerning social 
criteria for redundancy were observed. Instead it sought to save jobs 
through mobilizing employees and supporting processes of employee 
self-organization. The IGM members on the works council argued that in 
order to resist, employees had to understand that redundancies were not a 
necessity, and that management could act differently, especially since the 
company as a whole had just announced the second highest profits in its 
history. The works council developed an alternative plan for the company 
that recognized Siemens’ competitive environment. For that purpose it 
could use external resources provided by IG Metall. The union generated 
detailed analyses of IT markets and Siemens’ position. It also helped the 
works council use its legal right to involve external experts (under the Works 
Constitution Law, §80; §111 Betriebsverfassungsgesetz), establishing 
links with an economist who became a permanent advisor. Employees fed 
knowledge of technological developments, markets, customer demands 
and needs into the discussion, using the works councils’ intranet website 
but also new communication channels established through an employee 
network described below. The plan emphasized the importance of human 
capital. Staff continuity was required since technological development 
and the integration of existing technologies demanded staff continuity 
to avoid a “downward spiral.” Staff retention could be achieved through 
working time flexibility: all employees’ working weeks should be reduced 
by two hours with corresponding wage reductions, a move to be reversed 
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if business conditions improved. Additionally, outsourced work was to be 
brought back in house (for more detail, see Schuhler, 2003). The plan was 
publicized by the works council on the net. The plan gained credibility 
amongst workers, since it recognized the company’s position, affirmed 
their value as qualified specialists, and shared adaptation costs equitably. 
In September and October 2002 the works council’s home page registered 
150.000 “hits.” A typical e-mail to the works council read: “Well done, 
works council. The model you presented combines the demands of the 
business situation (quick, cost saving) and spreads the burden… Keep up 
the good work” (cited in Schuhler, 2003: 28).
It was only when the alternative plan appeared that mobilization theory’s 
“attribution” process was fully achieved since it convinced employees of 
management’s responsibility for the crisis. Employee willingness to resist 
was also furthered by de-legitimizing management’s offers. The works 
council and IGM pointed out that older workers (45 years +) were unlikely 
to find work through the Beschäftigungsgesellschaft. This institution was 
described as a “trick” to circumvent the provisions of dismissal protection, 
which provides cover especially for older workers, those with long tenure 
and families.
During this phase of the conflict, the main works councillors and their 
co-operators in the union thus strived to broaden and deepen employee 
involvement. Instead intensified discussion was required to enable 
employees to formulate and act upon their own interests (Mayer, 2005: 
4). Thus between August and December 2002, nine workplace meetings 
were organized, each attended by 3,000–4,500. Additional meetings were 
held outside the workplace, using IGM’s facilities. Employees sought to 
publicize the issue through demonstrations and stalls in Munich’s city centre 
(some 200 participated in this). As the conservative CSU demanded that 
Siemens adopt working time reductions to save jobs, media attention grew 
further. However, Siemens’ first reaction to employee resistance was to 
harden its position and threaten 2,300 redundancies for operational reasons. 
The works council stated that it would contest each case individually, i.e. 
there would be 2,300 lawsuits. IGM took a pragmatic stance in relation 
to individual legal assistance, normally given only after three months 
membership. The local IGM offered immediate coverage to those willing 
to join the union, greatly increasing employees’ willingness to bring cases. 
Within three weeks, 900 joined IG Metall; many others took up private 
insurance in order to be able to bring cases. A demonstration of 3,000 
exerted further pressure on management seriously to negotiate with the 
works council (Wanzek, 2005: 10). In a workplace agreement struck in 
late October 2002, management consented to a working time reduction of 
2.5 hours/week and to insourcing some work previously given to external 
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providers. The number of jobs to go at ICN was thus reduced from 2,300 
to 1,100. These 1,100 were to either sign termination agreements or accept 
transfer to the Beschäftigungsgesellschaft. Should these measures not be 
sufficient to reduce employment by 1,100, management would resort to 
redundancies. The selection process (i.e. which individuals to dismiss) 
was completely under management discretion, the workplace agreement 
did not involve the works council in the selection process (i.e. selecting 
people according to social criteria). Whereas the workplace agreement (or 
Sozialplan, “social plan”) might be seen to indicate the end of the conflict, 
it actually escalated.
In early October 2002, 876 individual employees received the 
management “offer”: around 350 accepted transfer to the Beschäftigungsge
sellschaft, 100 opted for a termination agreement or early retirement. About 
400 remained and in January 2003 management named 366 individuals it 
had selected for dismissal (Mayer, 2005: 7; Wanzek, 2005: 8). As the works 
council had not participated in the selection process it was now in a position 
to contest management’s selection on the grounds that management had 
not followed legal dismissal requirements. The works council found that 
management had dismissed predominantly older workers (45 +), those with 
long tenure (20 years +), women, and even those with special protection 
(e.g., handicapped workers or those with a tenure of more than 25 years). 
The works council had to prove that a specific selection had violated the 
law, and that the person could be employed elsewhere in the company. The 
works council objected in 362 cases, but in 200 cases management stuck to 
its decision. In these cases employees could turn to labour courts, however 
as the then works council chair said: “just because you’ve got boxing gloves 
[legal support] it does not mean you put them on and fight.” While the 
works council could provide juridical advice and the union pragmatically 
offered “free” legal assistance, another actor grew in importance and greatly 
increased employee’s willingness to contest redundancies and file suits due 
to unlawful dismissal. We now describe the origins and operations of this 
employee network.
The Employee Network (NCI): Origins, Operation and Leadership
The Siemens conflict saw the development of a novel form of worker 
self-organization, the NCI (Network Cooperation Initiative). At the end 
of this research, it linked around 900 employees. It offers information 
and advice on a broad range of issues and remains an influential actor in 
Hofmannstraße and beyond (<www.nci-net.de>). In the three years of its 
existence, the website has received around 750,000 hits and has attracted 
much mainstream media attention for its novelty, depth of coverage and 
informative content.
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Origins
NCI originated before management announced mass redundancies in 
the summer of 2002, since management previously sought gradually to 
reduce employee numbers. Management then targeted selected employees 
to participate in an outplacement programme. Nominally, participation was 
voluntary but management pressured those unwilling to participate. Some 
resisted because it signified acceptance of their redundancy. A prime mover 
in the network was a female employee, then not a union member.
This female activist wrote a letter to senior personnel, asking why she 
had been targeted. Management reacted by giving her a warning and, during 
a hearing of her case, threatened summary dismissal. She then turned to 
the works council for help. Until then she had little interest in workplace 
representation, as works councillors she had contact with “lacked the 
common touch.” She therefore established links with other targeted staff to 
share information, offer emotional support, overcome individuals’ isolation 
and develop an analysis of events. Small-scale meetings were held: “An 
employees’ network began to materialize: small, unnoticed [by works 
council, union and employer], without political impact” (interview notes). 
She had previously found Siemens management receptive to criticism and 
employee participation, and felt no need for union membership or other 
forms of representation. However, when threatened with redundancy, 
she was impressed by the support the works council gave her and her 
colleagues. Thus, close working relationships between the leading works 
council representatives and the female activist, the prime mover behind the 
nascent employee network, developed. This contact made her re-consider 
her position towards unionism and she joined IGM. In brief, relations 
between network and works council began and continued to be co-operative 
during the dispute.
Operation
While a small core of network activists had thus come together before 
the announcements of August 2002, its dynamic development began when 
individuals received letters offering termination agreements/Beschäftigu
ngsgesellschaft or redundancy in November 2002. Immediate employee 
reaction was described by the female activist: “It was as if a meteor had hit 
… whole departments put their work aside.” (Wanzek, 2005: 8; authors’ 
translation). A first e-mail call for an immediate meeting was answered by 
30–40 people. According to one participant, the introductory round lasted 
three hours as employees took the chance to talk about their personal 
situation and fears. Its main function was to establish space for open 
communication and break down individuals’ emotional isolation. Widely 
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observable reactions such as self-doubt and panic attacks were tackled by 
developing a collective understanding of the processes and individuals’ 
situation. The network (at that stage it did not yet have an official name) 
grew as its members approached their colleagues individually. The woman 
prime mover now offered to share her knowledge about employment law. 
She toured the workplace, giving talks, and people attending were asked 
to join the networks’ electronic mailing list. She thus took on functions 
usually taken by works councillors.
By December 2002 the network had 120 members, in January 2003 
it had grown to around 400 (Schuhler, 2003: 48). By mid-February 2003 
around 400 staff participated in sixteen working groups on a range of issues, 
including political questions such as labour market reforms, publicity and 
labour law. When management named individuals to be dismissed (January 
2003) the network e-mailed colleagues, suggesting a meeting. An activist 
described an early meeting (“the meeting of the 100”):
We just had the idea of bringing everyone together. We did not have a fixed 
programme, nor did we want one. We wanted to overcome the normal situation, 
where someone gives information while employees are little more than passive 
recipients, asking a question now and again. We intended to demonstrate what 
the network was all about, i.e. a completely democratic form of organization, 
without defined rules, with its own dynamic, coming alive through the ideas 
and thoughts of all of the participants, going through this period of change. 
We realized our concept was quite bold. We just gave a short introduction, put 
down some ideas for discussion on posters and then left people to themselves. 
It all could have gone terribly wrong; it was a “make or break” situation. But 
so was the employees’ situation. (<www.netzwerkit.de>)
The main idea was to create an open space for discussion in which people 
could participate as fully as they wished and to break with “representative/
proxy politics” (Stellvertreterpolitik; importantly, the German word carries 
two meanings in English: “representative” and “proxy”). The network would 
spread information widely and give workers the resources to act as they 
saw fit. Employees published numerous accounts on the website, describing 
their financial, work and family situations and their fears and feelings. 
The network’s second key function was thus to act as a support group for 
individuals in stressful situations. Openness to emotionality contrasted with 
the “coldness” of management and with that of traditional “male” (as the 
network’s originator described it) forms of worker representation. Thus, it 
did not conceive of itself primarily as a representative, nor as a bargaining 
body, but as a mutual support mechanism.
This function took prime importance following October 2002. It was 
then that employees had to decide individually whether to accept termination 
contracts, accept transfer to the Beschäftigungsgsesellschaft or fight dismissal 
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in the courts. Taking the company to court was something employees hard 
hardly envisaged before and which required some confidence. The works 
councillors, during the process, learnt that the NCI could fulfil a necessary 
function, a function that the established forms of workplace representation 
could not fulfil:1 whilst the works council could enlighten employees about 
their rights in redundancy situations, it could hardly influence the conditions 
required for workers actively to pursue these rights. According to the 
councillors, NCI’s “emotional labour” was fundamental. NCI was a space 
in which individuals met colleagues they were familiar with, where they felt 
secure and could develop self-consciousness. And only on this emotional 
foundation were workers prepared to use their rights, try to defend their 
jobs and to risk a lawsuit. The network was central to turning the individual 
cases into collective issues; it built solidarity. When, in early 2003, the 200 
individual objections against dismissal were to be filed, the NCI turned this 
into a public demonstration: 600 employees jointly marched to the Labour 
Court. As individual cases were held in court, the network made sure that 
the courtroom was filled with employees. Its website gave detailed reports 
of court proceedings and as employees kept winning cases, the confidence 
of the remaining employees grew.
Leadership and Structure
The network refers to its “members” (i.e. those who signed on to its 
e-mail list) although there are no subscriptions and members are free to 
act as they choose. Much of the network’s activity is conducted in small 
working groups; electing, or naming working group and network leaders 
has been avoided. This is part of a wider consensus that victimization by the 
company should be made as difficult as possible, which also made it difficult 
for the researchers to uncover further details on informal leadership. This 
“leaderless” feature was later criticized officially by IGM, as a refusal by 
NCI to name anyone as responsible for anything. Meetings could be called 
by anyone, “without anyone censoring the call,” but a co-ordinating group 
has been formed. Employees that would like to take the initiative on a certain 
issue just inform others via Email, whether or not something “happens” is 
then decided in practice by others taking up or not taking up the idea.
Elections have not been held for any positions, though the co-ordinating 
group recognizes that situations might arise requiring a ballot. The approach 
is “non-ideological,” rejecting organization and action according to 
“external” ideologies in favour of individuals’ interests, experience and 
objective requirements. It stresses the need to base activity on conviction, 
1. NCI on Air, 10.09.2003; <http://www.nci-net.de/Archiv/NCIonAir/01_Mitarbeiternetze-
100903-NCIonAir.mp3>.
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on comprehension generated through collective discussion and rejects 
leadership based on formal loyalties or “obedience.”
Network Self-Characterization
We summarize key elements of the networks’ self-characterization in 
table 1. The data on which this is based derive from personal interviews, 
the self-description of the slate that NCI ran in the works council election 
(<http://www.nci-br.de/br>) and NCI website documents. Though 
the network is a heterogeneous body, individual statements clustered 
consistently around the areas identified in these last two “official” 
statements. The qualities attributed to management were used frequently 
by both NCI and works council in political exchanges with management, 
pointing to the relevance of language and of framing issues.
TABLE 1
NCI’s Self-Characterization in Relation to its Characterization
of Management
NCI Management
Emotional Cold
Humane Inhumane
Reasonable, rational (vernünftig) Unreasonable, irrational
Demands and defends normal, stable 
employment to generate a climate 
that supports innovation. Thus acts in 
company’s interest. 
Abnormal employment situation, climate 
of fear hampers employees’ innovative 
potential. Harmful to company’s interest.
Non-ideological Ideological
Participative Arbitrary 
In favour of satisfying “fun” work Creates situation in which fun and 
creativity can’t develop
Responsible for the enterprise and for 
Germany as a location of production
Irresponsible towards company and 
country, disregard for wider societal 
development
The regulated form of German stakeholder capitalism is thus 
counterposed to the shareholder driven, American version. This is 
crystallized on placards carried on a demonstration: “The economy must 
serve the people” and “We won’t have our future traded on the stock 
exchange.”
Trade unionism was very weak at Hofmannstrasse, according to NCI 
members. IG Metall was just irrelevant to employees, who thought like their 
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employer (Wanzek, 2005). Initial perceptions of unionism in table 2 are 
derived from the same sources as table 1 and supplemented with findings 
from other studies of highly qualified white-collar workers (Baethge, 
Denkinger and Kadritzke, 1995; Faust, Jauch and Notz, 2000; Kotthoff, 
1998).
TABLE 2
NCI’s Self-Characterizations in Relation to its Characterizations
of the Union
NCI Union
Non-hierarchical, decentralized Strictly hierarchical, centralized 
Responsive, flexible, quick Bureaucratic, inflexible, slow
Encourages self-activity of Angestellte Represents blue-collar workers
Non-ideological, functional Ideological
Encouraging full employee voice Allowing controlled employee voice
Encouraging emotional reaction Not encouraging emotional reaction
The three organizations therefore had the potential for co-operation. 
NCI’s specific contribution was to increase the “social motives” (Kelly, 
1998: 34) for mobilization.
Employee Network, Works Council and Union
NCI – works council relations were mutually supportive, based on 
“open dialogue” and “constructive co-operation” (<www.netzwerkit.de>); 
the IGM works councillors regarded themselves as part of the network. 
The works council’s IGM majority actively encouraged NCI from the 
beginning. The strong tendency of representatives to “substitute” themselves 
for their constituencies (Schmidt and Trinczek, 1999) was therefore not 
present here. Councillors were aware of earlier OD processes in IG Metal 
and thus familiar with a “hidden” tradition of employee involvement. 
The works council majority argued that, faced with an employer who had 
decided to confront rather than co-operate, employees could not depend 
on the limited legal possibilities open to works councillors; they needed 
themselves to be active: “Proxy politics won’t yield any success in the 
future. […] Works council politics and trade union politics have to be 
founded anew and must be based on active workforces.” (Mayer, 2005: 2, 
author’s translation; also see Fieber, 2003). The main works councillors, 
whilst being easily identifiable as IGM members, in person contradicted the 
stereotypical picture many Hi Tech workers held of unionists. The works 
council showed high levels of expertise, was seen as competent, flexible and 
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receptive. In public exchanges with management it was very articulate and 
used an appropriate language: its s orientation on employee involvement 
and participation fitted with the high regard for the self-reliance Hi Techs 
workers traditionally display. This self-reliance was to be turned into a 
collective effort.
During the first phase of the conflict IG, Metall established very 
good working relationships with NCI and for the first time established a 
serious membership base in Hofmannstraße. The union provided important 
juridical advice and support to both works council and individual members. 
IGM took a pragmatic and flexible stance in relation to individual legal 
assistance, normally given only after three-month membership. The local 
IGM offered immediate coverage to those willing to join the union, greatly 
increasing employees’ willingness to bring cases. It displayed high levels 
of economic expertise which it fed into an alternative plan publicized by all 
three institutions and which reduced redundancies from 2,300 to 1,100. It 
also offered logistical back-up: meetings could be held at IGM’s facilities 
and the union offered to host NCI’s website. As it was feared that the 
company would sue individual employees or the website owner for breaches 
of confidentiality, transferring the website and thus liability to IGM offered 
greater protection to the network’s activists. As employees have the right to 
access the trade union site from their workplace for information purposes, 
the move also secured that employees could access the networks site. These 
supportive functions generated trust in the union; IGM was seen to offer 
protection and support to a mainly non-union network, without attempting 
to control its content. Through paying legal costs and facilitating NCI’s 
communications, the union was in mobilization theory’s terms reducing 
employees’ costs and risks of participation (or “increasing their reward 
motives”) and increasing the likelihood of success (Kelly, 1998: 34). The 
IGM thus practically demonstrated qualities high tech workers did not 
usually attribute to unions. IGM’s successful “renewal” is indicated by the 
fact that it recruited 900 members. In works council elections held in 2004, 
it increased its share of the vote to 46% while the AUB, whose campaign 
was supported by the employer, lost 10% (IG Metall, 2004). A new slate 
of NCI activists scored around 6% and its representative on the council 
formed a coalition with IGM. In 2004, voter turnout for the works council 
elections had increased and exceeded 70%. The union, works council and 
NCI thus worked in a symbiotic way, and for all three “institutions” the 
outcomes were positive.
Dispute Outcomes
During the first phase of the conflict (August 2002–October 2002) 
the works council, supported by the union, was largely successful in 
6- Croucher pages.indd   158 2007-03-23   10:33:53
159A GERMAN EMPLOYEE NETWORK AND UNION RENEWAL
de-legitimizing management’s plans. Mobilization was based on the 
condition that a credible alternative to management’s plans had been 
developed. As employees’ motivational problems became obvious and 
employees successfully influenced public opinion through demonstrations, 
etc., management finally agreed to negotiate with the works council. The 
resulting workplace agreement was a success for the council as it reflected 
many of its proposals and reduced job cuts from 2,300 to 1,100. The 
second phase of the conflict, beginning in October 2002, was successful
from employees’ point of view. By January 2005 all 159 employees had
won their cases against Siemens, with only a few cases still pending. The 
Munich Labour Court argued that the company had disregarded dismissal 
protection and had to continue employment for those dismissed. Siemens 
appealed in all cases but was unsuccessful in all but one case (Mayer, 
2005: 7).
In February 2004 IGM declared an end to the conflict at Siemens. Works 
councillors felt that employees were exhausted and those not threatened 
by redundancy feared that the conflict could threaten the existence of 
Siemens locally. There was also a strong interest on management side as 
local productivity was low, management legitimacy had suffered, it was 
obvious that its plans to cut employment had failed and the Siemenskonflikt 
was becoming something like an exemplary case for representatives 
elsewhere.
According to the union, a final workplace agreement on the future of 
those with long tenure, handicapped and elderly employees marked the end. 
However, this announcement took many by surprise and NCI members 
continued to voice criticism of Siemens’ treatment of these groups of 
employees. The network was not prepared to adopt the union’s “declaration 
of peace” with the company.
Continued NCI Activity and Tensions between NCI, Works Council 
and Union
Looking back on IGM’s initial reaction to NCI’s development, an NCI 
activist remarked: “Within IG Metall everybody said: this will peter out after 
four weeks. They observed us as if we were children playing in a sandbox” 
(employee interview). When early collapse did not occur, IGM showed that 
it feared a competitor union. A leading activist remembered a union official 
stressing “the difficulties of setting up a union. They feared we were in the 
process of building an IT union, something we never envisaged.” These 
fears receded as network activists adopted “the basic idea of unionism,” 
by experiencing that “a union is something that you can shape yourself” 
(interview with NCI activist). However, NCI activists’ rapprochement to 
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the “basic idea” idea of unionism co-exists with continuing reservations. 
As one network activist (an IGM member) argues:
Trade union and networks are separate structures which contradict each other, 
because unions are strictly hierarchical organizations. And the more powerful 
we are becoming the more frictions there are going to be. And now the 
union has got a problem. If they annoy us, we’ll go elsewhere. We have built 
contacts with other networks very quickly and our homepage can be moved 
within thirty minutes. We want to act freely, without prior consultation. We 
must be free to do our own publicity work. And we have considerable power. 
I think the union really doesn’t want to annoy us. So we lean on IGM but we 
are still ourselves.
The network continues to operate, providing support for Siemens 
employees and ex-employees. It has a monthly radio programme where, 
recently, a network member explained that the network is not a union 
but adopts a pragmatic but critical approach to unions; its main methods 
are openness and empowering people to act for themselves. It is linked 
with other similar networks or “projects” at other major companies such 
as Phillips, Electrolux/AEG, MAN and UPS. It also continues to allow 
members to express views on its website, some of which have criticized 
IGM agreements at other workplaces. Consequently, a union official urged 
the network to remove one such from its website. The dialogue between 
IGM and the network continues, but the union refuses to co-operate with 
the network. For reasons explained below, the union’s works councillors 
have expelled NCI councillors from the IGM group on the council.
How much the union learned from the experience remains an open 
question. One IGM official voiced scepticism: “systematic organizational 
learning just doesn’t happen.” The union presents a critique of NCI in an 
article that appeared on IGM’s Siemens Dialogue website in May 2005, 
declaring “The sad end of an exemplary project.” It praised NCI for having 
organized solidarity, arguing that it showed how self-help could work in 
a weakly unionized context, and proved that it could be effective. It was a 
model of self-organization; IGM had supported NCI because it achieved 
things that unions could not currently achieve on their own. Nevertheless, 
the union could not co-operate further with NCI. The network could not be 
represented as the future of workers representation; the network claimed to 
be a “grassroots” organization but in fact had opaque rather than democratic 
structures. The network had claimed the right to support other workers at 
MAN and Bayer, criticizing IGM’s agreements. Overall, NCI had adopted 
a “permanent opposition” stance that was easy but irresponsible; NCI could 
not and should not pose as “the better trade union.”
The Network’s female prime mover gives a different account. She 
argues that after the works council elections of 2004, where IGM achieved 
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a good result, the works council became both less co-operative with NCI 
and less transparent in its dealings with employees. When the works 
council reached an agreement with Siemens about redundancies in another 
part of the company, the network issued a leaflet about it, leading to NCI 
councillors’ expulsion from the IGM group on the works council. On the 
website she and other anonymous participants argue that the conflict is 
one between a form of unionization that is based on hierarchy and control, 
where member participation and democracy is only selectively used and 
applied. To describe the conflict as one between NCI and IGM is simply 
a way of externalizing the problem and the opposition. She claims IGM’s 
local behaviour is damaging unionism and cites IGM own directions for 
trade union work in the workplace to show that these have been violated 
by IGMs local leadership. To quote her:
...this is a conflict between those hierarchy-oriented long standing members, 
fearing for their power positions and those new Metallers who don’t accept 
blind obedience to hierarchy and command. IGM has not come to terms with 
the fact that it has people on the ground who are not ready to just follow 
calls for action and returns to work if asked to. It has not come to terms with 
members asking: Why should we do that? What can be achieved? And that 
adds constructive ideas. That’s what the conflict really is about.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Our first proposition was that emphasizing non-collective bargaining 
approaches may facilitate mobilization and is strongly supported. The works 
council and union, even in the context of the latter’s break with NCI, both 
acknowledged the network’s significant contribution to mobilization. It 
provided employees with a “low-level” access to activity. It contributed to 
making the redundancy issue a collective one. It took individual emotions 
and interests as its starting point and created a discursive space no other 
institution could offer. Its “emotional function” facilitated employees’ 
willingness to actively defend their jobs. Secondly, the network stimulated 
demonstrative action because it increased the level of association between 
workers. All respondents agreed that this had been a sine qua non of the 
Siemenskonflikt. Our second proposition was that these workers are likely 
to show a preference for non-traditional forms of collective organization. 
This proposition must be rejected on our evidence. These Hi-Tech workers 
saw a considerable and continuing role for the network but as part of 
a wider alliance between that organization, the works council and the 
union. Workers showed a strongly increased interest in all three forms of 
organization during and after the dispute. The network therefore contributed 
to union renewal. While the network allowed high levels of association 
and expression, the works council provided on-the-spot representation and 
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the union had both sectoral collective bargaining rights and resources that 
the other bodies lacked. The union’s high vote in relation to the NCI’s in 
the works council elections indicates that workers see the union’s works 
councillors as effective; this is compatible with continued interest in NCI. 
Our third proposition was that Hi-Tech workers’ organizations are likely 
to prioritize political and mutual aid activities over other possible fields of 
activity such as collective bargaining. This proposition is supported, since 
the network certainly prioritized both types of activity. Its discussion showed 
interest in collective bargaining issues, but the network had never claimed a 
bargaining role. In any event, to displace the primary collective bargaining 
agent, the union, strongly supported by the law during a dispute would be 
extremely difficult. The network was therefore strongly encouraged by the 
situation to adopt its non-collective bargaining approach. Its nature had 
more in common with North American organizations and prescriptions 
than with some of its German counterparts; why this is the case requires 
further comparative research. Our fourth proposition was that unions will 
display ambivalence towards local mobilizations where possible rival 
organizations emerge.
This proposition was largely supported, since the union, and the works 
council’s union group, initially supported the network but showed that they 
feared a rival organization becoming established and eventually broke with 
the network after the end of the dispute. Although the reasons for the break 
are disputed, all parties agree that the network’s criticism of union deals 
was an important cause. It might be argued that unions as representative 
institutions, selecting which interests to further and which interests to 
suppress, are not capable of long-term co-operation with forms of rather 
“libertarian” self-organization.
Our final proposition was that mobilization theory would provide an 
adequate framework for analysis of Hi-Tech workers’ mobilization. The 
theory was indeed useful, but with reservations. Mobilization involved 
three bodies and we summarize schematically in table 3 the contribution 
of each body to the three central processes of attribution, social identity 
and leadership.
Our reservations with respect to the theory are as follows. First, 
“discouraging of free riding” (something that may well be more significant 
during strikes than during this type of mobilization) was the opposite of 
both NIC and the union’s successful policies which provided information 
and support to workers but left the decision as to whether they should take 
legal cases to them.
Second, the theory only mentions emotion as a factor in mobilization 
in terms of leaders appealing to emotion (Kelly, 1998: 35–36). In this case, 
demand for an emotional forum came from below and therefore appeared 
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rather differently. Third, an important aspect of established practice, use 
of external experts, not mentioned in mobilization theory, played a vital 
role in achieving “attribution.” In this latter respect, union practice was in 
advance of theory. The theory bears the marks of its origins in an epoch in 
which classical IR concepts analyzed blue-collar mobilizations.
In conclusion, the employee network played a vital role in raising 
the social incentives to Hi-Tech worker mobilization at Siemens. It 
did not represent an alternative to the existing institutions of worker 
representation, but rather an important complement to them. It differed in 
this respect from several other recently emerged German organizations 
TABLE 3
Works Council, Union and Network Roles in Terms of Mobilization Theory
Attribution Social Identity Leadership
Works Council Publicly attributed 
blame to irratio-
nal management. 
Traditional forms of 
communication not 
sufficient, sees NCI 
as important arena for 
attribution processes 
and identity develop-
ment. 
Initially had weak 
links to Hi-Tech 
workers. Leading 
works councillor 
develops into charis-
matic figure.
Rejected normal “social 
plan” solution. Exerts 
leadership function but 
breaks with traditional 
“proxy” forms, i.e. 
sees need to constantly 
inform and involve 
employees and decide on 
this basis.
Leadership not based on 
traditional class rhetoric 
but based on expertise, 
and sensitive appeal to 
Hi Tech workers’ men-
talities/language, etc. 
Union Publicly attributed 
blame to management 
but union member-
ship exceptionally 
low at Siemens. 
Provided resources 
for alternative plan.
Initially strongly 
associated with 
blue-collar workers. 
Changed identity in 
course of action as 
receptive to Hi-Tech 
workers’ needs. 
Provided resources for 
developing alternative 
plan and supported legal 
action. Too weak to 
run action from outside 
but some influence via 
its members on works 
council.
Network Attributed blame to 
management, de-indi-
vidualized problems 
and had capacity to 
communicate this in 
effective ways to Hi-
Tech workers.
Strongly based on 
Hi-Tech workers 
identity, which 
it reinforced and 
developed. “Raised 
social incentives” to 
participation.
Created open space and 
encourages employees to 
act as they see fit, rejects 
any form of formal lead-
ership and insists that 
action must be based 
on comprehension and 
conviction.
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for specific occupational groups (such as doctors or airline pilots), whose 
appeal is precisely that they present an alternative. Further research is 
required to examine why different types of organization emerge. In our 
case, it may be relevant that previous “organizational development” 
programmes had sensitized local trade unionists to a need for change, as 
Heery (2005) identified as desirable, encouraging union openness towards 
the network’s ideas. The network operated in ways anticipated by much 
existing theory, but this theory failed clearly to predict the simultaneous 
increased unionization that occurred, showing that workers recognized the 
institutional complementarity. The Network’s essential contribution was to 
provide both a vehicle for appropriate forms of participation in a situation 
where worker representation had no strong roots and traditions amongst
Hi-Tech workers, and to create a bridge to unionization. The union 
initially reacted positively to the network and was a key beneficiary of the 
mobilization, but it is noteworthy that recruitment occurred not because of 
union organizing efforts but from an essentially external impetus and that 
marked frictions between the union and the network escalated after the 
dispute. The dialogue between the institutions continues and although it is 
too early to say whether it will lead to wider union renewal, the network 
has established links with other networks that may yet provide further 
impulses in that direction.
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RÉSUMÉ
La formation d’un réseau et un regain du syndicalisme en 
Allemagne : le cas du Siemenskonflikt
Cet essai analyse la formation d’un réseau chez les salariés de l’usine 
Siemens Hofmannstraße de Munich, Allemagne. Il s’agit d’un des cas 
de réseaux qui ont fait récemment leur apparition en Allemagne et qui 
présentent un développement remarquable très peu analysé de l’auto-
organisation des travailleurs. Lorsqu’est survenue l’annonce de mises à pied 
chez les cols blancs hautement spécialisés de l’usine, un réseau de salariés 
s’est formé pour fonctionner au sein d’une synergie créatrice et chargée de 
tensions entre le comité d’entreprise (Betriebsrat) et le syndicat IG Metall 
(IGM). Sans être une alternative à ces institutions, le réseau représentait à 
la fois un ajout et une faction critique à l’intérieur de celles-ci. Il s’est avéré 
une force puissante en aidant à résister aux mises à pied et il s’est allié par 
la suite à d’autres réseaux d’employés, posant de sérieuses questions au 
syndicat : s’agissait-il d’une occasion ou d’une menace pour lui ? Cette 
étude s’intéresse alors à ce qui est, d’une manière paradoxale, un secteur 
négligé de l’étude du regain du syndicalisme, c’est-à-dire l’auto-organisation 
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des travailleurs et la relation que le syndicat entretient avec elle. L’étude 
s’inscrit dans le contexte allemand, supposément le cœur du « modèle 
européen » de la représentation des travailleurs. S’il devait se renouveler 
ainsi, l’impact sur un plan international plus large pourrait être important.
Notre première hypothèse s’énonçait de la manière suivante : « en 
mettant l’accent sur d’autres approches que les approches collectives, on 
peut faciliter la mobilisation ». Cette hypothèse est fortement appuyée. Le 
comité d’entreprise et le syndicat ont tous deux reconnu la contribution 
significative du réseau à la mobilisation. Ce dernier donnait aux employés un 
accès à une activité concertée. Il contribuait à donner un caractère collectif à 
l’enjeu des excédents de main-d’œuvre. En prenant en charge les émotions 
et les intérêts comme points de départ, il a créé un espace de discussion 
qu’aucune autre institution ne pouvait offrir. En permettant l’expression 
des émotions, le réseau a facilité chez les salariés la volonté de défendre 
activement leurs emplois. En second lieu, le réseau a encouragé les salariés 
à poser des gestes d’éclat, parce qu’il relevait le niveau d’association entre 
eux. Tous les répondants étaient d’accord pour soutenir qu’il s’agissait là 
d’une condition sine qua non de la présence du conflit chez Siemens.
Notre deuxième hypothèse s’énonçait ainsi : « que ces travailleurs 
devaient probablement afficher une préférence pour des formes non 
traditionnelles d’organisation collective ». Cette proposition a été rejetée. 
Ces travailleurs du secteur des technologies de pointe voyaient un rôle 
important et soutenu pour le réseau, mais sous l’angle d’un élément 
d’une association plus large avec le comité d’entreprise et le syndicat. 
Les travailleurs manifestaient un intérêt fortement accru aux trois types 
d’organisation tant pendant qu’après le conflit. Par conséquent, le réseau a 
contribué au regain du syndicalisme. Pendant que le réseau permettait des 
niveaux élevés d’association et d’expression, le comité d’entreprise offrait 
une représentation ad hoc et le syndicat possédait des ressources et des 
droits de négociation collective que les deux autres n’avaient pas.
Notre troisième hypothèse était formulée de la manière suivante : 
« que les organisations des travailleurs des technologies de pointe devaient 
accorder une plus grande priorité aux activités politiques et d’aides 
mutuelles qu’à la négociation collective ». Cette proposition se voit 
appuyée, puisque le réseau accordait d’une manière certaine une priorité 
aux deux types d’activité. Tout en montrant un intérêt pour des enjeux 
de négociation collective, le réseau n’a jamais prétendu jouer un rôle en 
négociation. De toute façon, il serait extrêmement difficile de déplacer le 
syndicat, fortement appuyé par la législation, pendant un conflit. La situation 
favorisait fortement le réseau à emprunter une approche autre que celle de 
la négociation collective.
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Notre quatrième hypothèse était à l’effet que : « les syndicats vont 
faire preuve d’ambivalence à l’endroit d’une mobilisation locale d’où peut 
naître une organisation rivale ». Cette proposition est largement appuyée, 
car bien que le syndicat et le groupe syndical du comité d’entreprise aient 
dès le départ apporté leur soutien au réseau, ils ont coupé leur relation avec 
le réseau après le conflit. Quoique les raisons d’une telle rupture fussent 
discutables, toutes les parties ont reconnu que les critiques du réseau envers 
le syndicat en ont constitué une cause importante. On peut prétendre que les 
syndicats, à titre d’institutions représentatives, en choisissant de promouvoir 
certains intérêts et pas d’autres, sont incapables d’une collaboration à long 
terme avec des formes d’auto-organisation plutôt « anarchiques ».
Notre dernière proposition était à l’effet que : « la théorie de la 
mobilisation fournirait un cadre de référence adéquat à l’analyse de la 
mobilisation chez les travailleurs des technologies de pointe ». En effet, 
la théorie s’est avérée utile, mais avec certaines réserves. La mobilisation 
implique trois acteurs et nous présentons succinctement l’apport de chacun 
aux trois processus vitaux de l’imputation, de l’identité sociale et du 
leadership.
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